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SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION; APPROACH TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 2088; STATE 67727; STATE 67048; TEL AVIV 1591

DEPT PASS BEIRUT; LONDON; JIDDA; JERUSALEM

1. ON FOURTH I SAW KING HUSSEIN AND MADE PRESENTATION AS INSTRUCTED IN STATE REFTELS. I EXPLAINED I HAD TRIED TO SEE HIM JUST BEFORE HE LEFT FOR AQABA ON FIRST. GIVEN THE GRAVITY AND URGENCY WE ATTACH TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION, I HAD DECIDED IN HIS ABSENCE TO SPEAK TO THE PRIMIN ON THE SECOND. AFTER ASCERTAINING THAT THE PRIMIN HAD NOT YET PASSED OMRNY APPROACH, I THEN OUTLINED OUR CONCERN TO HUSSEIN ALONG THE LINES OF AMMAN 2088. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT UAR VIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE CEASEFIRE, BY THE INCREASED NUMBER AND SERIOUSNESS OF RECENT INCIDENTS BETWEEN ALL THE VARIOUS PARTIES, AND BY THE INCREASINGLY WARLIKE TONE OF STATEMENTS BEING MADE ON ALL SIDES. IN FACT, THE TONE OF SOME RECENT UAR AND ISRAELI STATEMENTS WAS REMINISCENT OF MAY AND JUNE 1967. I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE ESPECIALLY HOPED THERE WAS NO AUTOMATIC ARRANGEMENTS TO CAUSE JORDAN TO BECOME INVOLVED IF EGYPT OR SYRIA SHOULD BECOME ENGAGED IN A LARGER OR MORE SUSTAINED CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL. AFTER NOTING WE HAD EXPRESSED OUR SERIOUS CONCERN TO BOTH THE UAR AND ISRAEL (AND THAT WE HAD STRONGLY URGED

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ISRAEL TO BE MORE RESTRAINED WITH REGARD TO RETALIATIONS AGAINST JORDAN), I MENTIONED THAT WE BELIEVED ISRAEL DESIRES TO SEE THE SITUATION DEFUSED. I ALSO POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THE POINTS MADE BY MRS. MEIR TO AMB BARBOUR WITH RESPECT TO HOW MUCH ISRAELI PATIENCE WAS BEING TRIED IN THE BEISAN AREA (TEL AVIV 15911). I CONCLUDED BY THANKING HIM FOR RECEIVING ME JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR CAIRO, WHERE UNDOUBTEDLY HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING SOME OF THE VERY THINGS I HAD JUST MENTIONED.

2. HUSSEIN RESPONDED THAT HE FIRST WANTED TO ASSURE ME THAT "AT THIS TIME" THERE ARE NO ARRANGEMENTS BY WHICH JORDAN WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BECOME INVOLVED IF MORE GENERALIZED ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN HOSTILITIES SHOULD COME ABOUT. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WOULD BE GREAT PRESSURE ON JORDAN TO BECOME INVOLVED. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NOW NO AUTOMATIC ARRANGEMENTS, HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT A PATTERN OF CONTINUED INCIDENTS AND LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD FORCE UPON THE ARABS. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN APPEAL FOR "SOME RESULTS FROM THE EFFORTS OF OUR FRIENDS" IN THE FOUR POWER MEETINGS AND OTHER CONTACTS. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW THE ARABS COULD GO ON TAKING MUCH MORE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST AS LONG AS HE COULD TO KEEP THE SITUATION FROM WORSENING. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO HOPE THAT ISRAELI WOULD STOP ITS RETALIATORY RAIDS ON AND DEEP PENETRATIONS OF JORDAN; IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY THAT ISRAEL SHOW SOME WILL TO MOVE TOWARD PEACE INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING THE HARD LINE IT HAS BEEN TAKING.

3. I SAID I BELIEVED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTHERN JORDAN VALLEY REPRESENTED THE GREATEST SINGLE CAUSE OF INCIDENTS BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL. I REVIEWED MY DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT WITH THE PRIMIN AND STATED THAT, IF SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO PREVENT THE FEDAYEEN FROM INITIATING ACTIVITY IN THE BEISAN AREA, A GREAT DEAL OF THE PROBLEM COULD BE REMOVED. THERE WOULD BE LITTLE REASON FOR JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY TO ENGAGE IN FIREFIGHTS. MEANWHILE, OUR INFORMATION IS THAT THE ISRAELI CIVILIANS IN THE BEISAN AREA ARE PLACING MUCH PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO ACT TO PREVENT THEIR HAVING TO SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME IN SHELTERS. I MENTIONED THAT ONCE AGAIN PRIMIN RIFAI HAD TURNED DOWN MY

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IDEA OF PLACING UN OBSERVERS AT LEAST IN THE AREA OF THE OLD ARMISTICE LINE IF NOT ALONG THE WHOLE CEASEFIRE LINE.

4. OUR CONVERSATION CONCLUDED ON THE NOTE THAT HUSSEIN WOULD BE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR RESTRAINT ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE AND THAT HE INTENDED PERSONALLY TO REVIEW THE SITUATION UPON HIS RETURN FROM SAUDI ARABIA. SYMMES GP-3

NOTE: NOT PASSED BEIRUT, LONDON, JIDDA AND JERUSALEM BY OC/T.

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